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NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION 
TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD: 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that at a date and time selected by this Court, in the courtroom 
of the Honorable William H. Alsup at the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of California, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, non-party Anthony 
Levandowski will and hereby does move for an order modifying the Court’s March 16, 2017 
Order (Dkt. #61) and prohibiting Defendant Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”) from disclosing 
any information provided by Mr. Levandowski in the course of the Joint Defense and Common 
Interest Agreement entered into by Mr. Levandowski and Uber, and specifically prohibiting the 
disclosure of information concerning the due diligence review conducted by a third party under 
that agreement, including but not limited to the identity of the third party who conducted any 
such due diligence review, whether Mr. Levandowski possessed any documents that were 
reviewed by the third party, and the identity of any of Mr. Levandowski’s possessions that may 
have been reviewed. 
This motion is based on this notice of motion and motion, the accompanying 
memorandum of points and authorities, the supporting declaration of John Gardner, and 
accompanying exhibit, the pleadings, files and records in this case, as well as other written or 
oral argument which may be presented at the hearing. 
 
DATED:  April 4, 2017   RAMSEY & EHRLICH LLP 
 
By /s/ Amy Craig    
       Miles Ehrlich 
       Ismail Ramsey 
       Amy Craig 
       
Counsel for Non-Party Anthony 
Levandowski  
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Anthony Levandowski is not a party to this action, and we have no basis to believe that 
he is presently under criminal investigation.  But given the explosive nature of the accusations 
raised against him in this case, and the possibility that an investigation could be initiated at some 
later date, any prudent person in Mr. Levandowski’s circumstances would be wise to ensure that 
his constitutional rights remain fully protected. As the Supreme Court has emphasized for 
decades, the core purpose of the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee is not to shield the guilty, but “to 
protect innocent men . . . ‘who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances.’”  
Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21 (2001) (quoting Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 421 
(1957)). Further, because the Fifth Amendment’s protections turn not “upon the likelihood, but 
upon the possibility, of prosecution,” In re Master Key Litig., 507 F.2d 292, 293 (9th Cir. 1974), 
the Fifth Amendment can be implicated even in a civil lawsuit when no criminal investigation 
has been—or ever will be—initiated.    
Mr. Levandowski is requesting a modification of the Court’s standing privilege log 
requirement.  If applied in its usual fashion, the Court’s requirement would improperly compel 
Uber to disclose information protected by a common interest privilege and thereby undermine 
Mr. Levandowski’s Fifth Amendment right against compelled production as recognized by the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000), and Fisher v. United States, 425 
U.S. 391 (1976).  In making this request, Mr. Levandowski relies upon the following well-settled 
principles of law: 
• A client’s confidential communications with his attorney are protected by the attorney-
client privilege. Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1960).  
• A client’s potentially incriminatory communications to his attorney, whether explicit or 
implicit, are further protected against compelled disclosure by the Fifth Amendment. 
Fisher, 425 U.S. at 405.  
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• The Fifth Amendment prohibits a court from compelling a person to produce records or 
information if that act of production would tacitly communicate a “link in a chain” to 
evidence a prosecutor might use to build a case.  Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 
486 (1951); Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 208 n. 6 (1988); Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 38. 
• When an attorney shares his client’s potentially incriminatory communications in the 
context of a joint defense agreement creating a common interest privilege, all counsel 
who are parties to that agreement must maintain the confidentiality of those 
communications. United States v. Gonzalez, 669 F.3d 974, 978 (9th Cir. 2012). 
The immediate issue before the Court is precisely how detailed Uber’s counsel must be in 
listing on its privilege log the “due diligence report prepared by a third party that may (or may 
not) have referenced the collection of allegedly downloaded documents.” Dkt. #132 at 1:16-18 
(emphasis added).  In reliance on his rights under Hubbell and Fisher, Mr. Levandowski asks 
that Uber’s counsel—because of its common interest confidentiality obligations to Mr. 
Levandowski—be relieved of any obligation to provide detail concerning (1) the identity of the 
third-party who conducted any such due diligence review, (2) whether Mr. Levandowski 
possessed any documents that were reviewed by the third party, or (3) the identity of any of Mr. 
Levandowski’s possessions that may have been reviewed.  
This is necessary for two reasons.  First, ordering public disclosure of these facts on the 
privilege log would impair Mr. Levandowski’s attorney-client privilege because it would compel 
disclosure of confidences shared by Mr. Levandowski with his own counsel that were later 
communicated with other counsel as part of an enforceable joint defense and common interest 
privilege agreement. Second, requiring disclosure of these facts would separately violate Mr. 
Levandowski’s Fifth Amendment right not to be compelled to reveal the existence, location, 
possession, or identity of any documents that might furnish a link in a chain of possible 
incrimination. 
In similar circumstances, courts have recognized that it is improper to compel a degree of 
detail in a privilege log where, as here, such detail would tacitly disclose testimony protected by 
Case 3:17-cv-00939-WHA   Document 147   Filed 04/04/17   Page 7 of 20
  
3 
NON-PARTY ANTHONY LEVANDOWSKI’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF 
COURT’S ORDER DATED MARCH 16, 2017 
Case No. 3:17-cv-00939 WHA 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
the privilege against self-incrimination.  See United States SEC v. Chin, Civil Action No. 12-cv-
01336-PAB-BNB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182252, at *16-17 (D. Colo. Nov. 29, 2012) (finding 
that the Fifth Amendment and Hubbell prohibit requiring a respondent to submit a privilege log 
that lays out the tacit testimony inherent in production); In re Syncor ERISA Litig., 229 F.R.D. 
636, 649 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (rejecting a motion to compel a privilege log because “requiring 
defendant [] to produce a privilege log listing responsive documents may incriminate defendant 
[] by forcing him to ‘admit that the documents exist, are in his possession or control, and are 
authentic.’”).  
On behalf of Mr. Levandowski, we respectfully ask for the same accommodation here.   
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. Court order to Uber to produce documents from Mr. Levandowski 
In April 2016, Anthony Levandowski, Ottomotto LLC, Otto Trucking LLC, Lior Ron, 
Uber Technologies, Inc., and their respective attorneys entered into a “Joint Defense, Common 
Interest and Confidentiality Agreement” in connection with Uber’s proposed acquisition (at that 
time) of Ottomotto and Otto Trucking.  Declaration of John Gardner at ¶ 3 & Ex. A.  Under the 
agreement––which establishes a common interest privilege that Mr. Levandowski now asserts––
a due diligence report was produced by a third party.  Id. at ¶ 4; see also Gonzalez, 669 F.3d at 
978 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 In March 2017, Waymo sued Uber, Ottomotto, and Otto Trucking, alleging among other 
things that Mr. Levandowski stole trade secrets when he stopped working for Waymo and went 
to work for Uber in its autonomous-driving car program. Dkt. #23 at ¶10.  Waymo sought 
expedited discovery and a preliminary injunction.  Dkt. #24.  The Court ordered expedited 
discovery, and specifically ordered Uber to produce, among other things, “all files and 
documents downloaded by Anthony Levandowski . . . before leaving plaintiff’s payroll and 
thereafter taken by them.”  Dkt. #61 at 3, ¶ 4.   
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B. This Court’s requirements of a detailed privilege log 
To the extent that Uber intends to assert any privilege over documents, Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 26(b)(5) and this Court’s standing orders requires prompt production of a 
privilege log containing the following information: 
Privilege logs shall be promptly provided and must be sufficiently detailed and 
informative to justify the privilege.  See FRCP 26(b)(5).  No generalized claims of 
privilege or work-product protection shall be permitted.  With respect to each 
communication for which a claim of privilege or work product is made, the asserting 
party must at the time of assertion identify: 
(a)  all persons making or receiving the privileged or protected 
communication; 
(b)  the steps taken to ensure the confidentiality of the communication, 
including affirmation that no unauthorized persons have received the 
communication; 
(c)  the date of the communication; and 
(d)  the subject matter of the communication. 
Failure to furnish this information at the time of the assertion will be deemed a waiver of 
the privilege or protection. The log should also indicate, as stated above, the location 
where the document was found.  
Supp. Order to Setting Initial Case Management Conference in Civil Cases Before Judge 
William Alsup at ¶ 16; see also FED. R. CIV. PROC. 26(b)(5).   
On March 29, 2017, the undersigned advised the Court that a privilege log in this form 
would violate Mr. Levandowski’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, as 
interpreted by the Hubbell and Fisher line of cases.  3/29/17 Trans. at 5-6, 9-10.  Specifically, the 
undersigned noted that a privilege log in this form would reveal the existence, location, or 
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possession of evidence that Mr. Levandowski may possess and control that is of relevance to this 
action.  Id.   
The undersigned further noted that, to the extent Uber received information protected 
from disclosure by the Fifth Amendment, the company cannot disclose it because “counsel who 
acquires knowledge as part of a common interest agreement stands in the same shoes as counsel 
for an individual.”  Id. at 25:6-12.  Arturo Gonzalez, counsel for Uber, echoed this concern, 
stating he wanted to discuss how to provide a privilege log “without infringing upon a Fifth 
Amendment right.”  Id. at 12-13.  Mr. Gonzalez noted that Uber intended to identify a due 
diligence report on the privilege log, but was unsure whether to name the third party who 
prepared it.  Id. 
The undersigned asked to brief the question.  Id. at 25:19-21.  He also asserted Mr. 
Levandowski’s “Fifth Amendment [act of] production rights under United States v. Hubbell,” 
and made clear that Mr. Levandowski objected “to the disclosure of any confidential information 
that was acquired as part of a common interest privilege.”  Id. at 26:18-23. 
This Court’s March 31, 2017 order followed; it allows Mr. Levandowski to move under 
the Fifth Amendment to “suspend the production or the privilege log requirement.1”  Dkt. #132. 
III. ARGUMENT:   
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS MR. LEVANDOWSKI FROM HAVING 
HIS LAWYERS—WHETHER DIRECT OR JOINT DEFENSE—REVEAL 
CONFIDENCES THAT MIGHT INCRIMINATE HIM. 
A. Under The Fifth Amendment A Person May Not Be Compelled To Testify 
Against Himself.  
  
The Fifth Amendment privilege not to be a witness against oneself is a central tenet of 
our democracy.  Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955).  “[A]ny compulsory 
                            
1 In response to this Court’s Order of March 31, 2017, counsel for Mr. Levandowski has briefed the 
application of the Fifth Amendment (which, here, arises from a common interest privilege) to the 
production of the third party report and any required privilege log notations for this report.  This motion 
does not brief any other privileges that may apply to the production of all or any portion of the third party 
report, all of which are expressly reserved. 
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discovery by extorting the party’s oath . . . to convict him of crime . . . is contrary to the 
principles of a free government . . . . It may suit the purposes of despotic power, but it cannot 
abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom.” Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 
1, 9 n.7 (1964).   
1. This Fifth Amendment protections are broadly construed and apply 
to any testimony that could provide a link in the chain of evidence. 
Given its importance to our criminal justice system, “[t]his provision of the [Fifth] 
Amendment must be accorded liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to 
secure.” Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).  A person can invoke the Fifth 
Amendment’s protections in any proceeding—be it “civil, criminal, administrative, judicial, 
investigative or adjudicatory.”  Doe ex rel. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1263 (9th 
Cir. 2000).  In the civil context, “the invocation of the privilege is limited to those circumstances 
in which the person invoking the privilege reasonably believes that his disclosures could be used 
in a criminal prosecution, or could lead to other evidence that could be used in that manner.” Id.  
The “privilege against self-incrimination does not depend upon the likelihood, but upon the 
possibility, of prosecution and also covers those circumstances where the disclosures would not 
be directly incriminating, but could provide an indirect link to incriminating evidence.”  Id. 
(emphasis in original).   
Courts have found that the privilege applies when an answer could: 
• “[P]rovide an indirect link to incriminating evidence[.]” Doe ex rel. Rudy-Glanzer, 232 
F.3d at 1263. 
• “[P]rovide a lead or clue to evidence having a tendency to incriminate.” United States v. 
Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 1980). 
• Disclose “a fact that could serve as a link in a chain of circumstantial evidence from 
which guilt might be inferred” or a “fact” that “might furnish a lead to a bit of evidence 
useful to the prosecution.” Maffie v. United States, 209 F.2d 225, 228 (1st Cir. 1954). 
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• “[G]ive a prosecutor a starting point from which he might proceed step by step to link the 
witness with criminal offenses.” J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co. v. Houghton, Civ. A. No. 86-
2637, 1986 WL 14732, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 24, 1986). 
In short, the link-in-the-chain test is “broadly protective,” United States v. Chandler, 380 
F.2d 993, 1000 (2d Cir. 1967), and must be “liberally construed” by the courts.  Id. at 997. 
2. Fisher and Hubbell make clear that the Fifth Amendment protects 
implicit testimony inherent in the act of producing documents in response to 
a court order or a subpoena 
In Fisher v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that an individual can invoke the 
Fifth Amendment privilege in responding to a request for the production of documents.  The 
Court held that, even when the content of a document itself is not privileged, the act of producing 
the document may be, because the act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena “has 
communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the contents of the papers produced.”  425 
U.S. 391, 410 (1976).  In other words, when producing documents, a person tacitly testifies 
about (1) the actual existence of the papers demanded, (2) their possession or control by the 
witness, as well as the location of the documents, and (3) the witness’s belief that the papers are 
those described in the subpoena.  Id.  The Supreme Court reaffirmed this holding and the act-of-
production privilege in United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 32-36 (2000) (holding that, in 
response to a subpoena for documents, the subpoenaed party may refuse to produce because “the 
act of production itself may implicitly communicate statements of fact,” such as an admission 
that “the papers existed, were in the [witness’s] possession or control, and were authentic”). 
The Fifth Amendment’s protection regarding an act of production applies with equal 
force even if the witness himself no longer possesses the documents sought, but rather has turned 
the documents over to his attorneys and their agents in order to get legal advice. Fisher, 425 U.S. 
at 405 (holding that “the papers, if unobtainable by summons from the client, are unobtainable 
by summons directed to the attorney by reason of the attorney-client privilege.”). “The thrust of 
the Fifth Amendment is that ‘prosecutors are forced to search for independent evidence instead 
of relying upon proof extracted from individuals by force of law.’” United States v. Judson, 322 
Case 3:17-cv-00939-WHA   Document 147   Filed 04/04/17   Page 12 of 20
  
8 
NON-PARTY ANTHONY LEVANDOWSKI’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF 
COURT’S ORDER DATED MARCH 16, 2017 
Case No. 3:17-cv-00939 WHA 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
F.2d 460, 466 (9th Cir. 1963) (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944)).  “‘It 
follows, then, that when the client himself would be privileged from production of the document, 
either as a party at common law . . . or as exempt from self-incrimination, the attorney having 
possession of the document is not bound to produce.’”  Fisher, 425 U.S. at 404.  The fact that an 
individual furnished documents to his lawyer to obtain effective representation does not create an 
independent source from which to obtain those documents; rather, the lawyer stands in the shoes 
of his client when it comes to invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege.  Absent a grant of 
immunity, a court cannot compel an individual, or his attorney, to make a production that could 
be used to build a case against him.  Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 45 (“Given our conclusion that 
respondent’s act of production had a testimonial aspect, at least with respect to the existence and 
location of the documents sought by the Government’s subpoena, respondent could not be 
compelled to produce those documents without first receiving a grant of immunity under § 
6003.”) 
B. The Attorney-Client Privilege And The Duty Of Confidentiality Preclude An 
Attorney From Revealing Incriminating Communications That His Client Has 
Revealed In Confidence.  
 
Confidential communications between an attorney and his client are privileged. Fisher, 
425 U.S. at 403 (citing 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2292 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).  An attorney 
must keep these communications secret unless a client waives the privilege.  Perrignon v. Bergen 
Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 459-60 (N.D. Cal. 1978). 
This Court also requires that all lawyers practicing before it adhere to the California 
Rules of Professional Conduct, see NDCA Civil Local Rule 11-4 (requiring that any attorney 
practicing in the court be “familiar and comply with the standards of professional conduct 
required of members of the State Bar of California”), which even more broadly obligate 
attorneys to resist disclosing any “confidences” or “secrets” of their clients.  Both California 
statutory law and the California Rules of Professional Conduct mandate that lawyers “maintain 
inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself . . .  preserve the secrets, of his 
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or her client.”  Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(e)(1) (emphasis added); accord Cal. Rules of 
Prof’l Conduct R. 3-100(A) (“A member shall not reveal information protected from disclosure 
by Business & Professions Code § 6068(e)(1) without the informed consent of the client.”).   
The duty not to disclose client “confidences” and “secrets” is virtually absolute and much 
broader in scope than privilege.  See Vapnek et. al., CAL. PRACTICE GUIDE: PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY (The Rutter Group 2016) §7:26; see also Cal. State Bar Formal Opn. No. 2003-
161 (a California attorney’s ethical duty of confidentiality under §6068(e) protects “all 
information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be kept secret or 
the disclosure of which would likely be harmful or embarrassing to the client.”)  In short, if a 
client does not permit disclosure, then disclosure must be avoided unless an appropriate court 
order is obtained by the requesting party.  CAL. PRACTICE GUIDE: PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY, at §§ 7:86, 7:103-106. To avoid violating the duty of confidentiality, a lawyer 
must not disclose any client confidences unless and until the court has determined that an 
exception to §6068(e)(1) applies.  Id. at § 7:88.   
C. A Common-Interest Privilege Extends The Attorney-Client Privilege And 
Duty Of Confidentiality To Counsel Representing Third Parties 
In general, the disclosure to a third party of attorney-client communications destroys any 
privilege that might otherwise attach to such communications.  But that rule does not hold when 
the privilege holder and the third party share a common legal interest with respect to the subject 
matter of the communication and enter into their own agreement of confidentiality.  See, e.g, 
Gonzalez, 669 F.3d at 978.  This extension of the attorney-client privilege, known as a “common 
interest privilege,” “applies where (1) the communication is made by separate parties in the 
course of a matter of common interest; (2) the communication is designed to further that effort; 
and (3) the privilege has not been waived.”  United States v. Bergonzi, 216 F.R.D. 487, 495 
(N.D. Cal. 2003); see also United States v. Henke, 222 F.3d 633, 637 (9th Cir. 2000) (existence 
of a joint defense agreement extends the attorney-client privilege to create an implied attorney-
client relationship between the codefendants and their counsel).   
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One party to a joint defense agreement “cannot unilaterally waive the privilege for other 
holders.”  Gonzalez, 669 F.3d at 982; In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 
1990) (holding that all documents related to common claim “are subject to a joint defense 
privilege that [one party] may not waive unilaterally”). Courts recognize that allowing unilateral 
waiver of confidential communications by one party without the consent of the others “would 
likely severely undermine the rationale for the joint defense privilege in the first place.”  
Gonzalez, 669 F.3d at 983. 
A common interest or joint defense agreement is permissible in many circumstances.  It 
does not need to be in writing; it “may be implied from conduct and situation, such as attorneys 
exchanging confidential communications from clients who are or potentially may be 
codefendants or have common interests in litigation.”  Gonzalez, 669 F.3d at 979 (internal 
citations omitted).  Nor does it matter whether the litigation in question is civil or criminal, or 
even whether the parties would align on the same side of the pleadings.  Id. (citing In re Grand 
Jury Subpoenas, 902 F.2d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 1990)).  Indeed, the joint defense privilege applies 
even if litigation is not in the offing at the time of the agreement between the parties.  Nidec 
Corp. v. Victor Co., 249 F.R.D. 575, 578 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“The protection of the privilege 
under the community of interest rationale [] is not limited to joint litigation preparation efforts.  
It is applicable whenever parties with common interests join forces for the purpose of obtaining 
more effective legal assistance.”).  In all of these circumstances, it is sufficient that the legal 
interests of the parties invoking the privilege are aligned.  See Holmes v. Collection Bureau of 
America Ltd., No. C 09-02540 WHA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4253, 2010 WL 143484 (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 8, 2010) (finding joint defense privilege where “counsel for both defendants submitted 
sworn declarations that they agreed to pursue a joint defense strategy . . . and to communicate 
with each other regarding their shared legal interests”). 
Courts have expressly held that information shared between individuals and companies in 
the context of a potential acquisition can fall within the ambit of a common interest privilege’s 
protections.  See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 308, 310, 312 
Case 3:17-cv-00939-WHA   Document 147   Filed 04/04/17   Page 15 of 20
  
11 
NON-PARTY ANTHONY LEVANDOWSKI’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF 
COURT’S ORDER DATED MARCH 16, 2017 
Case No. 3:17-cv-00939 WHA 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
 
(N.D. Cal. 1987) (no waiver of attorney-client privilege when defendant, Bausch & Lomb, 
disclosed a patent opinion letter to a nonparty during negotiations for the purchase of a division 
of Bausch & Lomb); OXY Res. Cal. LLC v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. App. 4th 874, 898-899 
(2004) (the common interest “nonwaiver principle” applies to information disclosed in pre-
acquisition communications).  The determinative factor is whether the communication was 
“designed to further a joint legal effort” or “in the course of formulating a common legal 
strategy.” See Nidec Corp., 249 F.R.D. at 579 (discussing Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & 
Lomb, Inc.); see also OXY Res. Cal. LLC, 115 Cal. App. 4th at 898-99.  
Here, there is no question that a valid joint defense agreement exists between Mr. 
Levandowski and Uber.  It was memorialized in writing and is attached as Exhibit A to the 
Declaration of Mr. Levandowski’s attorney, John Gardner.  That agreement was entered into for 
the express purpose of protecting communications made in the course of an ongoing joint effort 
to defend against “potential investigations, litigation, and/or other proceedings relating to the 
proposed transaction between Ottomotto, Otto Trucking and Uber and/or any affiliates of Uber.”  
Ex. A to Gardner Declaration at 1.  In keeping with that purpose, the agreement contains an 
unconditional promise that the signatories would keep any documents shared under the 
agreement secret.  Id. ¶¶ 2-5. 
D. Requiring A Detailed Privilege Log Here Would Violate Mr. Levandowski’s 
Fifth Amendment Privilege 
The basic purpose of a privilege log is to provide information sufficient for other parties 
and the court to assess whether an asserted privilege applies, but without actually disclosing the 
information protected by the privilege itself.  Thus, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5)(ii) 
provides that privilege logs must “describe the nature of the documents, communications, or 
tangible things not produced or disclosed . . . without revealing information itself privileged or 
protected . . . .” (emphasis added).   
In the ordinary case, where no Fifth Amendment act-of-production right has been 
invoked, the detailed information required by this Court’s standing order can be provided 
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without revealing the privileged or protected content of the information for which protection is 
sought.  But the situation presented here is different—because public disclosure of even such 
commonplace details as whether a document exists, who may have possessed it, or where it is 
located would divulge information that the Fifth Amendment protects.  See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 
410. 
Accordingly, courts hold that the requirement of a detailed privileged log must yield to 
the constitutional right to be free from forced self-incrimination.  See Chin, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 182252, at *26; In re Syncor ERISA Litig., 229 F.R.D. at 649; see also In re Fustolo, No. 
13-12692-JNF, 2015 WL 9595421, at *1, 5 (Bankr. D. Mass. Dec. 31, 2015) (implicitly 
accepting argument that a privilege log would undermine right against self-incrimination by 
modifying the privilege log requirement).   
As the Court noted in its March 31, 2017 order, Uber’s counsel has already indicated in 
open court that, “prior to the acquisition of Otto Trucking LLC and Ottomoto LLC, Uber 
Technologies, Inc. obtained a due diligence report prepared by a third party that may (or may 
not) have referenced the collection of allegedly downloaded documents.” Dkt. #132 at 1:16-18 
(emphasis added).  Adding further detail to this disclosure is precisely what threatens Mr. 
Levandowski’s Hubbell and Fisher rights. To the extent that Mr. Levandowski may have 
produced any documents for review by a third party hired by counsel for the common purpose of 
obtaining legal advice, his doing so would have conveyed the same implicit testimony that 
accompanies every act of production—namely, a tacit assertion that documents exist, that they 
were within his possession, and that they were responsive to a request or question posed as part 
of the privileged due diligence effort.   
What the Hubbell and Fisher line of cases teach, at bottom, is that there is no meaningful 
constitutional difference between “saying something” with words and “saying something” with 
the act of production.  Hence, any testimonial communications that Mr. Levandowski made 
through his act of production to his own counsel, and then to any other counsel bound by a 
common interest privilege, are twice-protected against court-ordered disclosure.  These 
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communications are protected by the attorney-client privilege, as extended through the common 
interest privilege here, and they are protected further under the Fifth Amendment. The Court 
cannot, consistent with the Fifth Amendment, order Mr. Levandowski—or any counsel owing 
obligations of attorney-client confidentiality to him—to disclose information that could furnish a 
“link in the chain” to the existence, possession, location, or identity of evidence that may be used 
in any possible criminal prosecution of Mr. Levandowski.  
Plaintiffs are certainly free to use any legitimate tools of civil discovery to locate 
evidence they deem relevant to their civil lawsuit.  But they are not free to use the power and 
authority of this Court to order disclosures that are protected under Mr. Levandowski’s Fifth 
Amendment rights. Thus, absent an order granting Mr. Levandowski immunity coextensive with 
18 U.S.C. § 6002 or a showing by the government that it already knew of the existence, location, 
possession, and identity of such documents with a degree of particularity rendering each question 
a “foregone conclusion,” any order compelling Uber’s counsel to disclose these confidential 
testimonial communications on a privilege log would run afoul of the Fifth Amendment.  See 
United States v. Bright, 596 F.3d 683, 692 (9th Cir. 2010) (It is only “[w]here the existence and 
location of the documents are a foregone conclusion and the individual adds little or nothing to 
the sum total of the Government’s information by conceding that he in fact has the documents . . 
. that enforcement of the summons’ does not touch upon constitutional rights.”). 
E. This Court Should Modify Its Order To Suspend The Requirements Of A 
Privilege Log For Any Documents Protected By The Fifth Amendment. 
The Court’s order to Uber—which by its terms would require the company to produce 
any documents (to the extent it received any) that Mr. Levandowski produced under a common-
interest privilege—would violate Mr. Levandowski’s Fifth Amendment rights.  With respect to 
any such documents, this Court should modify its order to require only disclosure of information 
sufficient to establish (a) the existence of a common-interest agreement between Mr. 
Levandowski and Uber, and (b) that Mr. Levandowski provided information to the third-party 
conducting due diligence under the agreement.  Uber should not be required to disclose 
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information regarding the location of any protected document, including the name of the third-
party vendor, or the subject matter beyond noting “due diligence report.”  Requiring Uber to 
provide this information would violate the Fifth Amendment as those details could serve as a 
link in the chain for the government to obtain the report and use it in any criminal investigation 
of Mr. Levandowski.  Hubbell, 530 at 45 (information regarding “the existence and location of 
the documents sought” is protected by the Fifth Amendment). 
To the extent the Court requires additional information from Mr. Levandowski relating to 
Fifth Amendment privilege issues, Mr. Levandowski is prepared to submit the information in 
camera and ex parte, a procedure that is approved by the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. 
Drollinger, 80 F.3d 389, 393 (9th Cir. 1996).  
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
/// 
///  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
To properly protect Mr. Levandowski’s Fifth Amendment rights, this Court must modify 
the normal requirements of a privilege log with respect to the third-party due diligence report.  
Without this requested accommodation, this Court will be compelling Mr. Levandowski to 
disclose information that he shared in confidence with his lawyers under an attorney-client and 
common-interest privilege, in violation of Hubbell and Gonzalez.  If Mr. Levandowski is forced 
to do so, his implicit testimony will surely be used against him later, should a criminal 
investigation develop. 
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